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Book Reviews 
"NOR LONG REMEMBER" 
OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN 
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By George 
P. Fletcher. 1 Oxford University Press. 2001. Pp. ix, 292. 
$25.00 
Daniel A. Farbel 
Exactly four years after the surrender . . . Robert Anderson re-
turned to raise his old flag over Fort Sumter. By then, the 
sounds of battle had given way to the stillness at Appomattox 
and the issues that inflamed the antebellum years had been set-
tled. Slavery was dead; secession was dead; and six hundred 
thousand men were dead. That was the basic balance sheet of 
the sectional conflict. 
David Potter3 
Walk into any large bookstore, such as your local Borders 
or Barnes & Noble, and you will find a separate section devoted 
to the Civil War-not just books covering the entire war or 
books about Lincoln and other major leaders, but biographies of 
a dozen generals and chronicles of individual battles, and even 
entire volumes about portions of battles, such as the second day 
at Gettysburg.4 Forty million people tuned in to watch a PBS se-
1. Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. 
2. McKnight Presidential Professor of Public Law, Henry J. Fletcher Professor of 
Law, and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, University of Minnesota. 
3. David Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 at 583 (Harper & Row, 1976). 
4. See James M. McPherson, Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American 
Civil War 244 (Oxford U. Press, 1996) ("For Gettsyburg we have an 800-page tome on 
the first day alone plus two volumes by a single author on the second day totaling 725 
pages.") 
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ries about the War.5 Clearly, the Civil War still looms large in 
popular consciousness. 
Not so in the law. In the past thirty years, only about 
twenty Supreme Court opinions have referred to "Abraham 
Lincoln" or "President Lincoln. "6 Seven times as many opinions 
referred to "James Madison" and "Alexander Hamilton."7 
Thomas Jefferson received about five times as many mentions as 
Lincoln.8 These earlier figures do enjoy perennial public atten-
tion, but on nowhere near the scale of Lincoln and the Civil War. 
Thus, the late Eighteenth Century dominates our view of consti-
tutional history and eclipses the Civil War in our legal culture, in 
a way that it fails to do in popular culture. 
In his latest book, George Fletcher seeks to remedy that 
imbalance. He offers an important reappraisal of the constitu-
tional significance of Lincoln and the Civil War. The Civil War, 
he contends, "called forth a new constitutional order." (p. 2) 
The principles of this new order, embodied in the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, "are so radically different from our original 
Constitution, drafted in 1787, that they deserve to be recognized 
as a second American Constitution." (p. 2) According to Profes-
sor Fletcher, what he calls the first republic was based on the 
social compact, individual freedom, and republican elitism. In 
contrast, the second republic was based on "organic nationhood, 
equality of all persons, and popular democracy." (p. 2) This 
second constitution was repressed but never destroyed. "Even 
after the judges turned their backs on the new order, the second 
constitution, sanctified by the six hundred thousand who died in 
its gestation, remained a firm but minimally visible commitment 
of American political culture." (p. 7) Repressed into. the legal 
subconscious (p. 1), the "Civil War constitution became our al-
ternative charter, our Secret Constitution, waiting in the wings 
for a more propitious time to step out on the stage of open judi-
cial debate." (p. 7) After the War, "in addition to embedding 
the states in the rule of law, the new constitutional order em-
barked on an affirmative program to ensure equality." (p. 25) 
5. ld. at 238. 
6. A Westlaw search on July 5, 2001 for "("Abraham Lincoln" "President Lin-
coln") & date (after 1970)" produced 21 documents. 
7. A Westlaw search on July 5, 2001 for "("James Madison" "Alexander Hamil-
ton") & date (after 1970)" produced 146 documents. 
8. A Westlaw search on July 5, 2001 for ("Thomas Jefferson" "President Jeffer-
son") & date (after 1970)" produced 102 documents. A post-1970 search for "Jeffe~son" 
produced 662 documents, as opposed to 318 for "Lincoln," but both searches retneved 
many documents in which these were part of individual or geographic proper names. 
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The "heart of the new consensus is that the federal government, 
victorious in warfare, must continue its aggressive intervention 
in the lives of its citizens." (p. 25) 
The Civil War was obviously a critical event in American 
history, and the Reconstruction Amendments were clearly a ma-
jor change in the constitutional order. So much is a truism. 
Where Fletcher departs from the conventional wisdom, how-
ever, is in arguing that the critical constitutional moment took 
place at Gettysburg rather than in Congress and in declaring the 
upshot to be an entirely new constitutional regime rather than a 
transformation of the old one. The verdict on this bold recasting 
of constitutional history is mixed. Fletcher performs an impor-
tant service by emphasizing the importance of the war in consti-
tutional development. 
Part I of this review provides a more detailed account of 
Fletcher's argument. As shown in Part II, however, the book 
does not present a solid evidentiary case for the Secret Constitu-
tion. This would be a serious flaw if the thesis were offered as a 
definitive account of our constitutional history. There are a 
number of indications, however, that Fletcher's purposes are 
more exploratory. He applauds the existence of multiple, incon-
sistent readings of the historical record. (p. 109) Some features 
of the book suggest that Fletcher's own thinking is in the process 
of evolving. On several occasions, he stakes out a strong posi-
tion-spending pages, for example, arguing vehemently that a 
particular Supreme Court opinion is an abomination, (pp. 152-
160) only to close with the afterthought that the decision "is 
hardly as heartless and indifferent to wealth discrimination and 
social justice as it appears at first blush." (p. 161) Similarly, a1-
though much of the book seems to be a lament that the Secret 
Constitution has failed to triumph over the old one, Fletcher 
ends with a call for a pragmatic accommodation between the 
two. (pp. 228-229) Indeed, the notes make it clear that in the 
course of writing the book, Fletcher has sharply modified some 
positions previously staked out in his earlier work. (pp. 279 n. 
19,282 n. 7) 
Thus, the book seems to be part of a work in progress rather 
than a definitive account. Its real contribution may not lie in the 
details of the thesis but rather in its central insight. That insight 
is both valid and important. The constitutional regime did 
change in some fundamental ways in the course of the Civil War, 
even before any formal constitutional amendments. What hap-
pened at Gettysburg is as important for understanding the mod-
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ern constitutional regime as the formal amendment process. As 
Part III of the review explains, the war experience transformed 
constitutional practices and understandings. Under the extreme 
pressure and heat of the Civil War, the old constitutional regime 
melted and recrystalized into its modern form. Just as limestone 
is transformed into marble deep inside the earth, so a constitu-
tional metamorphosis took place between Sumter and Appomat-
tox. 
I. THE DUALITY THESIS 
Before we consider the evidence, a careful explanation of 
Fletcher's views is in order. Like some other recent writers, such 
as Bruce Ackerman, Fletcher views constitutional history as di-
vided into distinct regimes. (p. 2) The "first Constitution" was 
based on individual freedom, republican elitism, and the concept 
of the social compact. It stood for the "maximum expression of 
individual freedom, at least against the federal government," 
carving out "a space for each person to stand alone, free of gov-
ernmental interference." (p. 2-3) It also focused on rule by the 
"virtuous few." (p. 3) Under what Fletcher calls a reign of "an-
cien principles," the dominant value was liberty rather than 
equality. (p. 204) Government was the "interloper, the enemy, 
the potential violator of our freedom to do as we please." 
(p. 213) 
But the Civil War called forth a new constitutional order-
one based on nationhood, equality, and populism. (p. 2) Volun-
tary consent, the basis of the original Constitution, "marks the 
people" while "[h]istory breeds the nation." (p. 2) The pream-
ble to the new Constitution is found in the Gettysburg Address, 
which became a kind of "secular prayer" reminding us of our 
"collective commitment to nationhood, equality, and democ-
racy." (p. 4) This crystallization of natural law principles began 
at Gettysburg and was memorialized in the Reconstruction 
Amendments. (p. 9) Unlike the adoption of the first Constitu-
tion in the cool deliberation of a constitutional convention, the 
second Constitution emerged from "the suffering of a redemp-
tive war,"-"forged not by election but the cleansing action of a 
war." (p. 10) Unlike the first Constitution's historically un-
rooted social compact, the new order represented not only the 
present but the past-not just the legislators who voted for the 
Reconstruction Amendments but also the dead at Gettysburg 
and elsewhere, who "if the new order is realized, 'shall not have 
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died in vain."' (p. 28) The new constitutional order announced 
at Gettysburg also stands in "radical contrast" to the old Consti-
tution by defining citizenship, bringing "the principle of equality 
to the fore," and beginning the move toward universal suffrage. 
(p.29) In contrast, the original Constitution "slighted the prob-
lems of nationality and citizenship, it sidestepped the problem of 
equality, and it minimized the significance of popular democ-
racy." (p. 29) The Civil War, then, initiated "a second Ameri-
can Republic." (p. 2) 
But this new order was suppressed by the courts almost 
from the moment of its birth. (p. 8) Although new judges re-
placed those of the Dred Scot era, they were still stamped with 
ante bellum values and ideas, rather than the new spirit of na-
tionalism and equality. (p. 114) "It is or [was] almost as though 
the Civil War had accomplished only one objective, namely set-
tling the issue of secession, while doing nothing to define the na-
tion of the United States or to establish a principle of equality 
among all its citizens." (p. 128) In the Slaughterhouse Cases, for 
example, the Court missed the opportunity to make the Consti-
tution a charter of economic equality. (p. 129) The Court in-
voked the concept of reasonableness to uphold the statute, a 
concept apparently antithetical to the "strict rule suggested by 
the Maxim 'all men are created equal."' (p. 174) Similarly, the 
post-war Court overlooked the application of the equal protec-
tion clause to gender discrimination. "Apparently, it lay beyond 
the imagination of the justices in the 1870s that someday equal 
protection would be extended to protect all those created in 
God's image." (p. 130) The Court also continued to give too 
much credence to the states. After the Civil War, Fletcher says, 
it would have made sense to view the Tenth Amendment as an 
anachronism and states merely as convenient administrative 
units. (p. 118) 
By the 1890s, then, "the Secret Constitution had gone into 
full occlusion." (p. 171) More recently, the Court again be-
trayed the ideals of the Second American Republic by upholding 
disparities in state school funding and laws barring convicted 
felons from voting. (p. 162) Thwarted in the courts, the new 
principles became "a firm but minimally visible commitment of 
American political culture," best expressed in repeated constitu-
tional amendments expanding the franchise. (p. 7) Despite its 
abandonment by the Court, the Secret Constitution "spontane-
ously percolates through civil society." (p. 189) More recently, 
however, the Secret Constitution has reasserted itself in judicial 
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opinions, especially dissents. In particular, Fletcher applauds 
Justice Stevens for invoking the great maxim that all men are 
created equal. (pp. 177 -187) 
What does the Secret Constitution mean? Its first prong is 
nationhood. The Civil War marked the consolidation of the 
United States as a nation in the European sense. (p. 12) Rather 
than being based on the voluntary association of a social com-
pact, nationhood involves a kind of organic solidarity based on 
the "bonds of memory." (p. 58) Nationalism is not merely a 
concept but a "romantic surge." (p. 63) "Nationhood rings of 
romance," appealing "not to the analytic mind but to the senti-
mental heart." (p. 124) 
The second prong of the Secret Constitution is a belief in af-
firmative government. "The Thirteenth Amendment betokens 
an entirely new way of thinking about government-not as an 
ever-threatening enemy, but as a necessary partner in the build-
ing of a society free of interpersonal exploitation." (p. 214) The 
core mandate of the Thirteenth Amendment was for govern-
ment to "keep a vigilant watch on all labor transactions to insure 
that there never again would arise relationships bordering on 
slavery or involuntary servitude." (p. 110) In the new order, 
then, government "is not the enemy of freedom but rather the 
mechanism by which freedom is secured in a society that tends 
toward domination and oppression." (p. 215) Thus, in 
Fletcher's view, the Secret Constitution embodies the European 
concept of constitutional freedom rather than the libertarianism 
of the old Constitution. 
The third prong is equality. (p. 2, 8) "The commitment, 
first and foremost, of the new constitutional order was to the 
equality of all persons affected by the laws of the United States." 
(p. 110) In this way, the Secret Constitution provides the basis 
for opposition to "unqualified rights of speech, of religion, and 
of criminal defense" by targets of racist speech, opponents of re-
ligious preferences, and victims of crime "who are forgotten in 
the rush to protect defendants." (p. 9) This commitment to 
equality has also required equal participation by all citizens in 
government (p. 2), and equal treatment for all. The Secret Con-
stitution requires that "all individuals, black and white, men and 
women, gay and straight, born in wedlock and out of wedlock, 
should be treated equally under the law." (p. 97) As with na-
tionalism, the power of this idea is as much emotional as intellec-
tual. Fletcher emphasizes that the roots of equality are religious: 
"The central idea that generates the concept of universal human-
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ity or universal brotherhood is that we are made in the image of 
God." (p. 103) 
Fletcher does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of the 
Secret Constitution's implications for current social or legal is-
sues. He does, however, sketch some of them. He views the dis-
enfranchisement of felons as a brutal violation of the Secret 
Constitution, having the particularly unfortunate effect of disen-
franchising vast numbers of minority voters. (pp. 147-151). 
Likewise, he sees the Supreme Court's resolution of the 2000 
election as an affront to the principle of government "of the 
people, by the people, and for the people." (p. 258) The Secret 
Constitution also mandates equal educational opportunity, 
meaning statewide equality of funding for schools. (pp. 152-161) 
The current system of higher financing in richer districts, he 
tartly observes, is merely "a 'head-start' program for the rich." 
(p. 153) The decision upholding such financing "represents the 
low point in the historical influence of the values of nationhood, 
equality, and democracy that inspired the Secret Constitution." 
(p. 154) A proper understanding of equality "would have led 
rather rapidly to the conclusion that grossly unequal spending 
was a violation of the equal dignity and equal merit of all chil-
dren living in the state." (p. 155) As mentioned earlier, Fletcher 
views Justice Stevens's equal protection opinions as paradigm 
applications of the Secret Constitution. (pp. 177-187) He also 
finds the Secret Constitution at work in more surprising places-
in proposed flagburning and victims' rights amendments to the 
Constitution (pp. 197-204) and in the Prohibition experiment. 
(p. 197) He views the Eighteenth Amendment as "the most sig-
nificant of the lot, for once again we witness in action a govern-
ment solicitous of the welfare of its people." (p. 193) 
Fletcher is less clear about the status of the Secret Constitu-
tion in modern society. He begins by comparing the Secret Con-
stitution to the deep structure of a language, providing a "bed-
rock of our legal culture that influences and shapes the decisions 
of courts and lawyers the way the unconscious influences behav-
ior or the deep grammar shapes our sense of proper syntax." 
(p. 1) He also speaks of the Civil War as establishing a "new le-
gal regime." (p. 2) The emergence of this new regime was not 
only a "major disruption in our constitutional history" (p. 10) 
but also a "historical necessity, and there is no turning back from 
the course we then adopted." (p. 11) As the values of the Secret 
Constitution have found their way into proposed and actual con-
stitutional amendments, and into federal legislation (p. 189), 
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these values provide the basis for a "deeper meaning" ready to 
come alive if given "faith and personal investment beyond the 
surface meaning." (p. 92) 
Throughout, Fletcher portrays the Secret Constitution as a 
potent legal force and a fitting object of celebration-a "compel-
ling ideological whole" that would have triumphed except for 
"reactionary forces that sought to mystify and entrench the val-
ues of 1787." (p. 56) Elsewhere, Fletcher speaks of the original 
Constitution as analogous to the feudal order of France, to 
which the Secret Constitution compares "as any redeemed legal 
culture compares to the brutality and chaos that precedes it." 
(p. 24) Thus, throughout much of the book, Fletcher seems to 
be advocating that we abandon the first Constitution and ac-
knowledge the Secret Constitution as the true font of wisdom. 
But Fletcher's endorsement of the Secret Constitution is, in 
the end, more guarded. As it turns out, he is willing to counte-
nance alternative readings of the history or at least, certain kinds 
of alternative readings: 
May all these readings flourish. They testify to the innate 
multiplicity of meanings inherent in the second founding of 
the United States in the postbellum legal order. Our only 
problem, then as now, is that we are not sure which way the 
revolutionary refounding of the nation should go. (p. 109) 
This passage seems clear in its enthusiasm for abandoning the 
original Constitution in favor of a radical refounding, though it 
expresses a degree of agnosticism about the precise direction to 
take. But even this enthusiasm for constitutional reformation 
becomes ambiguous by the end of the book. 
Besides the two constitutional regimes, Fletcher also speaks 
of the emergence of a third legal regime, "a 'pragmatic' middle 
road" between the original and the second constitutions. (p. 6) 
At times, he seems disdainful of pragmatism for replacing moral 
absolutes with slippery concepts of reasonableness. "Either you 
are equal or you are not. It is not a matter of degree, not a ques-
tion of reasonably relating means to ends." (p. 175) Yet, in the 
end he seems to see no escape from our being "locked in ongo-
ing contradiction between the values of our first and our second 
constitutions." (p. 222) "The Civil War may have achieved 
unity of the nation, but it left our minds in ideological tatters." 
(p.225) 
Thus, Fletcher's final position is deeply pragmatic. 
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The rule of law dictates an ongoing quest for reconciliation. 
The Secret Constitution will ever challenge us to find the right 
way of reconciling the commitments of our historical nation 
with the choices of a freely associating people, the require-
ments of equality with the opportunities of freedom, the will 
of the many with the wisdom of the few. We sought a Consti-
tution and we found that we had two. And with two constitu-
tions in constant tension, we are redeemed from the dogma-
tism of those who believe they have the last word. (p. 229) 
II. THE MISSING EVIDENCE 
431 
Professor Fletcher's project is based on an arresting insight 
about the transformative effect of the Civil War. Yet, his efforts 
to describe that transformative effect are marred by a failure to 
provide a solid evidentiary grounding. 
Rather than a careful marshaling of historical evidence, the 
book too often presents casual assertions unbacked by attention 
to the historical record, including some that could have been 
cured by a careful inspection of the Constitution itself. One ex-
ample is the assertion that "the charter of 1787 said nothing 
about how one becomes a citizen either of a state or of the na-
tional polity"- the "matter was left entirely to state law." 
(p. 124) But Article I § 8, clause 4 empowers Congress "to es-
tablish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."9 Similarly, the dat-
ing of the Emancipation Proclamation is said to be highly signifi-
cant because it refers to "the year ... of the Independence of the 
United States of America the eighty-seventh." (p. 37) This 
"unusual mode of dating" (p. 36) reflected "some dissonance be-
tween [Lincoln's] relying on 1776 as the beginning of the Ameri-
can nation and his acting in an office constituted by a docu-
mented drafted in 1787." (p. 37) But the Constitution itself is 
dated "in the Year of Our Lord [1787) and of the Independence 
of the United States of America the Twelfth." There was noth-
ing innovative about Lincoln's dating, or about his view that the 
nation predated the Constitution. 
The book also features a few offhand assertions of unclear 
logic. Here are some examples: 
• "As time passes and our ranks are continually nour-
ished by immigrants, the descendants of slaves consti-
tute an increasing percentage of the 'original Ameri-
9. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 4. 
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cans'- those whose forebears were here at the signing 
of the Declaration of Independence or at least to wit-
ness the surrender at Appomattox." (p. 63) But this 
makes no sense. The number of immigrants is irrele-
vant to the composition of the pool of "original Ameri-
cans.' If the descendants of slaves are an increased per-
centage of that pool, this can only be because they have 
a higher birth rate than other original Americans or a 
greater tendency to marry immigrants. 
• "The great evil of Germany's sending its own people 
to Auschwitz constituted a breach of faith with the 
German Jews who placed their trust in the nation of 
their birth." (p. 79) But this sentence cannot be meant 
seriously-it would imply that killing Polish and Rus-
sian Jews was relatively less serious than killing Ger-
man Jews. 
One striking example of inattention in handling the histori-
cal record involves a statement about Holmes, whom Fletcher 
describes elsewhere in the book as the main apostle of pragma-
tism. In the course of a discussion of how criminal law has been 
used to keep blacks subservient, Fletcher says: "In 1881, the 
great scholar Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote approvingly of 
an antebellum case in which a young male slave was convicted of 
attempted rape for walking too closely to a white woman on the 
street.'' 10 (p. 142). 
This is inaccurate. First, Holmes did not speak particularly 
approvingly about the case. In the course of a discussion of un-
completed criminal attempts, Holmes made the following state-
ment: "On the other hand, a slave who ran after a white woman, 
but desisted before he caught her, has been convicted of an at-
tempt to commit rape.'' 11 A page later he added: "No doubt the 
fears peculiar to a slave-owning community had their share in 
the conviction which has just been mentioned." This is not much 
of an endorsement. Second, the case did not involve "walking 
too closely to a white woman on the street." The defendant was 
running, not walking. Indeed, Holmes seems to have tilted the 
10. The assertion is not utterly implausible, since Holmes was not known for his 
sensitivity on racial issues. While it is not central to fletcher's argument, this assertion 
does have some relevance since Holmes's 1881 assertion is offered as documentation of 
the betrayal of the Secret Constitution when local police became "in effect, the heirs to 
the unrestrained power of the slave owners." (p. 142) Moreover, Fletcher is a renowned 
expert on criminal law and presumably more careful in this area than elsewhere. 
11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 68 (Little, Brown,1881). 
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facts to make the conviction· appear less justifiable. According 
to the Alabama Supreme Court-which, incidentally, reversed 
the conviction and ordered a new trial- the incident took place 
in the country, the victim began to run and was pursued by the 
defendant, who "had on no clothing except a shirt" and who re-
peatedly demanded that she stop.12 This is a far cry from 
Fletcher's description of the case. 
Like the reference to Justice McLean as "Justice McClean" 
(p.167), these are relatively peripheral slips. But the book's his-
torical foundation is shaky on other, more central questions.13 
Given the subtitle of the book ("How Lincoln Redefined 
American Democracy"), close attention to Lincoln's views might 
seem appropriate. Fletcher, however, limits himself to a few 
passages in Lincoln's major public addresses. The result is an in-
complete portrait in three important respects. 
First, Fletcher attributes to Lincoln a "casual attitude to-
ward formal constitutional institutions, such as the writ of habeas 
corpus." (p. 5) During the war, " [ t ]he Constitution of 1787 lay 
suspended in the fires of battle" (p. 38), and Lincoln did not 
take his obligations under the old Constitution "particularly se-
riously." (p. 80) In general, Fletcher says, "Lincoln's posture 
toward the 1787 Constitution was less than reverent." (p. 37) 
This is an oversimplification. In his first inaugural, for in-
stance-consistent with earlier statements on the subjed4 -
Lincoln called for enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause and 
said that legislation on the subject was required by the oaths of 
all members of Congress to support "the whole Constitution- to 
this provision as much as to any other. "15 Similarly, the Emanci-
pation Proclamation was shaped in part by Lincoln's view that 
the war ~ower allowed him to free slaves only in Confederate 
territory. 6 Rather than viewing the Constitution as "suspended" 
12. Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860). 
13. If the notes are any indication, Fletcher does not seem to have delved deeply 
into the historical literature. For instance, he repeatedly relies on a PBS documentary 
and the accompanying book as historical authority. See 262 n.2, 263 n.lO. 264 n.20, 266 
n.35 
14. See Allen C. Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President 129 (William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999). 
15. First Inaugural Address, reprinted in Abraham Lincoln, Selected Speeches and 
Writings 285 (Vintage Books, 1992) ("Selected Writings"). 
16. Lincoln's view was that "as a matter of civil administration, the general gov-
ernment had no lawful power to effect emancipation in any State," so that emancipation 
was justified only under the President's war power. Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 
8, 1863), in Selected Writings at 406 (cited in note 15). In response to the suggestion that 
the Emancipation Proclamation should apply to occupied portions of Virginia and Lou-
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during the war, he argued that the Constitution itself distin-
guishes between peacetime and "cases of rebellion or invasion 
involving the public safety"- "I can no more be persuaded that 
the Government can constitutionally take no strong measures in 
time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could 
not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded 
that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, be-
cause it can be shown not to be good food for a well one."17 
Fletcher's strongest evidence of Lincoln's attitude toward 
the Constitution relates to the suspension of habeas. Fletcher 
quotes a famous passage in which Lincoln says that even if ha-
beas suspension violated the Constitution, it was better to violate 
one provision of the Constitution than to let the whole thing "go 
to pieces." (p. 38) True, Fletcher says, most of us would agree 
with Lincoln if the "stark option" of national survival were in 
question, but "there is no evidence that the country's circum-
stances were anywhere near this flashpoint of imminent destruc-
tion." (p. 38) 
This description of the habeas issue, however, fails to pro-
vide a complete account of Lincoln's views or of the circum-
stances. After the passage which Fletcher quotes, Lincoln con-
tinues: "But it was not believed that this question was presented. 
It was not believed that any law was violated." 18 Lincoln then 
points out that the Constitution does allow suspension during 
rebellion or invasion, where required by the public safety, and 
does not explicitly say whether the power to suspend is vested in 
the President or in Congress. "[T]he Constitution itself, is silent 
as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provi-
sion was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be 
believed the framers of the instrument intended, that in every 
case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be 
isiana, Lincoln pointed to constitutional concerns: 
The original proclamation has no constitutional or legal justification, except as a 
military measure. The exemptions were made because the military necessity 
did not apply to the exempted localities. Nor does that necessity apply to them 
now any more than it did then. If I take the step must I not do so, without the 
argument of military necessity, and so, without any argument, except the one 
that I think the measure politically expedient, and morally right? Would I not 
thus give up all footing upon constitution or law? Would I not thus be in the 
boundless field of absolutism? 
Letter to Salmon P. Chase (Sept. 2, 1863), in Selected Writings at 394 (cited in note 15). 
17. Letter to Erasmus Coming and Others (July 12, 1863), in Selected Writings 379-
80 (cited in note 15). 
18. Message to Congress in Special Session, in Selected Writings at 307 (cited in 
note 15). 
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called together; the very assembling of which might be pre-
vented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion." 19 
Whether or not Lincoln was right, this is a serious constitutional 
argument, not just a casual disregard of constitutional limits. 
And when the writ was first suspended, the nation was indeed in 
great peril. Lincoln did not have enough troops to defend Wash-
ington. Access to the city was possible only through Maryland, 
where it was threatened by mobs and by the possibility of seces-
sion by the state legislature.20 Admittedly, Lincoln was not al-
ways overly scrupulous in his attention to legal forms, and he did 
appeal to the overriding requirements of necessity, but it is mis-
leading to say that he simply set the Constitution aside during 
the war. 
The book also oversimplifies the role of religion in Lincoln's 
thought. Fletcher speaks of Lincoln as "the president whose 
thinking and rhetoric were probably more influenced by the bib-
lical idiom than the writings of any other president." (p. 39) 
"Lincoln," he says, "saw the entire Civil War as a righteous 
judgment of the Divine." (p. 39, see also p. 48) In the Gettys-
burg address, "[i]n style as well as substance, Lincoln returns to 
the religiosity of the 1776 Declaration." (p. 40) In Fletcher's 
view, the Civil War was "a war understood by many, Lincoln in-
cluded, to have theological significance," drawing its "power 
from religious claims about the humanity of all human beings, 
and its leaders found their solace in psalms and prayers." (p. 51) 
In short, as demonstrated by the use of the phrase "under God" 
in the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln viewed the American people 
as having a "divine mission in history." (p. 4) 
Again, the reality was more complex. Early in his political 
career, because he was not a member of any church and had ex-
pressed deistic views, Lincoln was forced to make a public denial 
of charges that he was overtly hostile to religion.21 As explained 
by the author of a recent full-scale study of Lincoln's relation-
ship with religion, "[e]specially for those who had not known 
Lincoln before the war, Lincoln's comfortable resort to biblical 
language made it easy to impute some form of piety to him. "22 
But Lincoln was not a conventional Christian, and "his reper-
toire of biblical citations was more a cultural habit rather than a 
19. Id. 
20. See David Herbert Donald, Lincoln 298-99 (Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
21. See id. at 114. 
22. Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President at 313 (cited in note 14). 
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religious one. "23 He read the Bible, it was said, in the relaxed 
manner of a man enjoying a good book.24 His personal religious 
views seemed closer to deism (which was of course also the view 
of Jefferson, drafter of the Declaration that Lincoln loved to 
quote./5 Although on a few occasions he used more conven-
tional religious language/6 he seems not to have viewed himself 
as having any personal relationship with a God he generally 
seemed to regard as remote and unfathomable.27 In some sense, 
Lincoln's sensibility may have been profoundly religious and 
probably deepened in the course of the war. But he was not de-
vout in the conventional sense evoked by Fletcher's description. 
Fletcher also goes astray in his discussion of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which he regards as central to the Secret Constitu-
tion. He paraphrases the amendment to say: "Securing and pro-
tecting the autonomy of labor would become the duty of all state 
power. Government would have to keep a vigilant watch on all 
labor transactions to insure that there never again would arise 
relationships bordering on slavery or involuntary servitude." 
(p. 110) More generally, "[i]f servitude should be understood as 
relationships of domination, then an open-ended approach to 
the concept would have generated a watchdog role for the fed-
eral government in inspecting and supervising private relation-
ships of potential exploitation and domination." (p. 140). Thus, 
the amendment "betokens an entirely new way of thinking about 
government-not as an ever-threatening enemy, but as a neces-
sary partner in the building of a society free of interpersonal ex-
ploitation." (p. 214) 
Fletcher's expansive reading of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
however appealing it might be in other respects, is weakly 
grounded in history. Rather than being a revolutionary break-
through in ideas about government, the language of the Thir-
teenth Amendment was lifted directly from the Northwest Ordi-
nance, which predated the Constitution. The sponsors of the 
Amendment refused to modify this familiar language, and re-
buffed an effort by Senator Sumner to add a declaration that "all 
persons are equal before the law."28 Supporters of the amend-
23. Id. at 313. 
24. Id. at 314. 
25. Id. at 319-25. 
26. See id. at 342. 
27. Id. at 418-19. 
28. See Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitution 
277 (West Publishing, 1990). 
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ment generally did not view it as ~iving Congress legislative au-
thority over civil rights in general. 9 Rather than the expansive 
charter for social reform envisioned by Fletcher, most Republi-
cans took a narrow view of slavery.30 The Amendment's sup-
porters believed only that "it would give emancipated slaves at 
least a right not to be chattelized and perhaps additional basic 
rights of locomotion, labor, and security to person and prop-
erty."31 
Moreover, contrary to Fletcher's efforts to cast the Thir-
teenth Amendment as an effort to reform oppressive relation-
ships in the labor market, Republicans like Lincoln indignantly 
rejected any analogy between the slavery and the status of work-
ers in the North, an analogy that Southerners were prone to 
make.32 "Your whole hireling class of manual laborers ... are 
essentially slaves," as one Southerner famously put it, the only 
difference being that "our slaves are hired for life and well com-
pensated. Yours are hired by the day, not cared for, and scantily 
compensated. "33 Lincoln was confident that anyone who worked 
hard could move up in American society, and he was untroubled 
by the distribution of wealth-not surprising in someone who 
had gone from being an impoverished farmhand to an affluent 
railroad lawyer.34 Lincoln made his views on the subject per-
fectly clear. Attacking Southern efforts to analogize Northern 
workers to Southern slaves, he said: 
The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for 
wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land, 
for himself; then labors on his own account another while, and 
at length hires another new beginner to help him. This, say its 
advocates, is free labor-the just and generous, and prosper-
ous system, which opens the way for all . . . . If any continue 
through life in the condition of the hired laborer, it is not the 
fault of the system, but because of either a dependent nature 
which prefers it, or improvidence, folly, or singular misfor-
tune.35 
29. See Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freed-
men's Rights, 1861-1866 at 117 (Fordham U. Press, 2000 ed.) 
30. ld. 
31. Id. at 120. 
32. See Donald, Lincoln at 233-35 (cited in note 20). 
33. McPherson, Drawn with the Sword at 49 (cited in note 4) (quoting Senator 
Hammond). 
34. Donald, Lincoln at 234 (cited in note 19). 
35. Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
(Sept. 30, 1859), in Selected Writings at 234 (cited in note 15). 
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In this respect, Lincoln was no precursor of FDR; he believed 
mightily in the free enterprise system. 
Fletcher's response to all of this would probably be that it is 
irrelevant. What matters, he might say, is not the original under-
standing of the Thirteenth Amendment or Lincoln's own reli-
gious or social perspective, but rather the way in which the 
amendment and Lincoln's speeches have become embedded in 
our culture. In a section rejecting originalism as a constitutional 
philosophy, Fletcher says that "the relevant perspective is not 
that of those who first engage in the practice but rather of those 
who witness the pattern of the past and adopt it as binding on 
themselves." (p. 33) "So," he says, "it is with the Gettysburg 
Address. The right question is not what Lincoln intended, but 
rather what the words meant to those who looked to them as the 
explanation of the war and as a charter for freedom and equality 
for all Americans." (p. 33) This position has some merit-for 
example, the historical significance of the Magna Carta in Eng-
lish law has little to do with the specific understanding of the 
Barons gathered at Runnymede. But taking this approach seri-
ously would require mustering substantial historical evidence 
about how American culture actually responded to the Civil 
War's legacy. 
Unfortunately, however, the book does not provide sub-
stantial evidence that Lincoln, the Gettysburg Address, the Civil 
War, or the Thirteenth Amendment actually retained the cul-
tural meaning embodied in the Secret Constitution. The evi-
dence suggests the contrary. While Fletcher suggests that it was 
only the reactionary Justices of the Supreme Court who buried 
the egalitarian implications of the Civil War, recent historical re-
search shows that the Court was reflecting the popular mood. In 
the interests of national reconciliation, whites North and South 
united in their desire to expunge the racial aspects of the con-
flict- "the white supremacist vision ... locked arms with recon-
ciliationists of many kinds, and by the turn of the century deliv-
ered the country a segregated memory of its Civil War on 
Southern terms. "36 What Fletcher calls the Secret Constitution 
did survive, particularly among blacks, but it was not the domi-
nant view in American culture.37 Instead, the reconciliationist 
vision celebrated the courage of soldiers on both sides and held 
36. David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory 2 
(Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 2001 ). 
37. Sec id. at 2-3, 357-58, 383. 
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that Reconstruction was a tragic mistake?8 Birth of a Nation, 
not the Gettysburg Address, shaped the national memory of the 
war a half century later.39 This vision, shameful though it may 
have been, was ascendant, and if the Secret Constitution still 
held sway, it was very secret indeed. 
The story may have been different a century after Gettys-
burg-the era of Martin Luther King and the Warren Court. 
But the case remains to be made that the First Reconstruction 
provided the deep structure for the Second, rather than merely 
serving as one source of inspiration.40 The book's thesis is that 
the cultural memory of the post-war Secret Constitution has 
made a real difference in our later history, and this is a claim that 
requires empirical support. 
Thus, taken as a structural description of American popular 
or legal culture over the past century and a half, the Secret Con-
stitution is badly in need of empirical evidence which the book 
does not attempt to provide. Taken as a description of the Civil 
War era, the Secret Constitution does not seem to be supported 
in some important respects by the historical record. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL METAMORPHOSIS 
In contrast to Bruce Ackerman's focus on the post-War 
adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments as the crucial con-
stitutional change,41 Fletcher draws our attention to the war it-
self as a period of constitutional tranformation. This is an im-
portant insight. Indeed, the war transformed the role of the 
federal government and its relationship with its citizens. The 
war had a critical impact on federalism, but apart from ending 
slavery, the war and Reconstruction failed to produce lasting ra-
cial equality. 
38. Id. at %, 358. 
39. ld. at 395. 
40. Similarly for the Gettysburg Address. True, the Gettsyburg Address has been 
memorized by millions of school children, but it remains "more often iterated than un-
derstood." McPherson, Drawn with the Sword at 185 (cited in note 4). Scholars have 
identified five strands of the Lincoln image in American culture: Savior of the Union, 
Great Emancipator, Man of the People, the First American, and the Self-Made Man. Id. 
at 180. While these themes are "blended in the grand theme of democratic nationalism," 
id., they fall short of the "Founder of a New American Republic" image that Fletcher's 
thesis would suggest. 
41. Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 99-252 (Belknap Press of 
Harvard U. Press, 1998). Ackerman docs briefly discuss the elections of 1860 and 1862, 
but only as background for his discussion of the formal amendments. Id. at 126-36. 
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A brief reprise of the history may be helpful. 42 Lincoln 
took the position that the Union was perpetual and that seces-
sion was unconstitutional. Consequently, he pledged to hold 
those Southern forts still in Union possession, the most impor-
tant of which were Fort Pickens in Florida and Fort Sumter in 
Charleston. On April 12, the Confederates opened fire on Sum-
ter, and the war came. 
The North could hardly have been less prepared for war. It 
had virtually no army. Because of the Jacksonian attack on the 
Bank of the United States, it lacked a modern fiscal system with 
which to finance the war. It had no bureaucracy with which to 
organize the war effort. Worse, the president had no clear legal 
authority to oppose secession, let alone to take the drastic steps 
needed to bring the South back under federal authority. Never-
theless, Lincoln did take decisive action. He proclaimed a 
blockade of Southern ports, disbursed funds to anti-secessionists 
without legal authorization, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, 
and hastily mustered an army consisting of volunteers and state 
militias. Slowly and clumsily, the North mobilized for war. 
Although the original aim of the war was simply reunifica-
tion, inevitably Republicans like Lincoln came to believe that 
emancipation was necessary to achieve the avowed goal of pre-
serving the Union. In 1862, Congress provided for the seizure of 
rebel property, including slaves, and prohibited slavery in the 
Territories and the District of Columbia. In the fall of that year, 
Lincoln issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which 
became final at the beginning of 1863. 
All of this took place in the face of great constitutional un-
certainty. The Constitution, after all, said nothing explicitly 
about secession. It also said nothing about waging civil war, nor 
did it speak to the question of reconstructing a defeated South. 
Strict constructionists like President Buchanan believed that the 
North was powerless to oppose secession, to wage civil war, or to 
conclude the war by Reconstruction. During the war, however, 
Republicans came to believe that the national government's 
powers were adequate to resolve whatever problems were facing 
the nation.43 
42. This and the following two paragraphs are drawn from Farber and Sherry, His-
tory of the American Constitution at 276-77 (cited in note 28), which provides appropriate 
citations. 
43. ld. at 300. 
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Prior to the war, the state governments were primarily re-
sponsible for meeting the basic needs of American citizens. 
Apart from mail delivery, the national government had little im-
pact on the daily lives of most Americans. Consequently, before 
the war, state citizenship was paramount. From this premise, it 
was a small step to the conclusion that allegiance to the state 
came before allegiance to the federal government. But such 
concepts obviously could not survive the Civil War, a war for the 
primary allegiance of the citizen.44 In the Prize Cases, 45 the Su-
preme Court made it clear that citizens owe "supreme alle-
giance" to the federal government and only "qualified alle-
giance" to their home states.46 
By the end of the war, even cautious constitutional analysts 
like Senator Reverdy Johnson argued that the federal govern-
ment could protect black civil rights "because it is a necessary, 
incidental function of a Government that it should have author-
ity to provide that the rights of everybody within its limits shall 
be protected, and protected alike."4 Similarly, Senator Trum-
bull emphasized that to "be a citizen of the United States carries 
with it some rights . . . They are those inherent, fundamental 
rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all coun-
tries . . . The right of American citizenship means something. "48 
The Civil War also marked an unprecedented wave of fed-
eral legislation. After decades of wrangling about the propriety 
of federal funding for "internal improvements," Congress 
funded the Pacific railroad with hundreds of millions of dollars 
in cash and land grants.49 During wartime, the government en-
couraged the adoption of uniform track gauges and other steps 
toward unifying the rail system.50 The protective tariff, another 
subject of constitutional dispute dating back to the South Caro-
lina Nullification Crisis, was adopted and remained unchallenged 
for half a century.51 The Homestead Act gave three million 
acres of land to over twenty-five thousand migrants before the 
44. Id. at 300.01. 
45. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
46. Id. at 673. For the classic study of the pre-war confusion over citizenship and its 
resolution, see James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 
(U. North Carolina Press, 1978). 
47. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 530 (1866). 
48. Id. at 1757. For further discussion of evolving concepts of national citizenship 
in the Civil War era, see Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the 
Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863 (1986). 
49. Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President at 375 (cited in note 14). 
50. Id. 
51. I d. at 376-77. 
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war was even over.52 In the meantime, the Morrill Act funded 
agricultural colleges in twenty-two states, the foundation of to-
day's major state universities.53 The national bank system was 
created, as well as paper money and an income tax.5 This ex-
pansion of the role of the federal government turned out to be 
permanent, and in the end, all of these wartime innovations have 
become permanent fixtures in American life. 
Thus, the way that Americans related to the federal gov-
ernment had irrevocably changed by the time of Lee's surrender. 
How did this change in our vision of federalism take place? 
Fletcher is right, once again, to point out the importance of pub-
lic sentiment in this transformation, a sentiment that Lincoln ar-
ticulated with astounding clarity in a few brief words at Gettys-
burg.55 The end of Reconstruction and the triumph of 
reconciliationism submerged racial equality as a theme, but left 
unchallenged (and even in some ways reinforced) the sense of 
national unity. But two other factors were also important, one 
political, the other intellectual. 
First, Lincoln's election in 1860 marked a transformation in 
American politics. Until1860, the South had dominated the po-
litical system far out of proportion to its population. Two-thirds 
of the presidents had been Southern slaveholders, along with an 
equal proportion of the Congressional leadership and nearly as 
many Supreme Court Justices.56 Southern influence on federal 
policy was augmented by frequent threats of secession-threats 
successfully deployed on all manner of subjects, from diplomatic 
recognition to Haiti (taboo because the ambassador would have 
been black), to the Compromise of 1850 and the executive's 
support for a pro-slavery state Constitution in Kansas.57 As Lin-
coln pointed out, secession threats were in effect an effort to 
trump the democratic process.58 By the end of the Civil War, 
52. Id. at 378. 
53. Id. at 379. 
54. Id. at 380-81. 
55. Fletcher is not the first, of course, to highlight the importance of Gettysburg. 
See Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America (Simon & 
Schuster, 1992). 
56. See McPherson, Drawn with the Sword at 64 (cited in note 4). 
57. ld. at 41-42. 
58. Now we are told in advance, the government shall be broken up, unless we 
surrender to those we have beaten [in the 1860 election), before we take the of-
fices. In this they are either attempting to play upon us, or they are in dead 
earnest. Either way, if we surrender, it is the end of us, and of the government. 
They will repeat the experiment upon us ad libitum. A year will not pass, till we 
shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which they will stay in the Union. 
Letter to James T. Hale (Jan. 11, 1861), in Selected Writings at 276 (cited in note 15). 
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this Southern dominance was broken forever. Even after South-
ern whites resumed their control of congressional seats, they 
were a minority, and their party of choice was to elect only two 
presidents before World War I. Thus, the actors responsible for 
constitutional interpretation, from 1860 onwards, no longer 
based their readings on the South's distinctive brand of constitu-
tionalism. They rapidly accumulated a body of precedents from 
all three branches of government that supported a much fuller 
role for the national government. 
Second, the war discredited the strongest version of states' 
rights ideology, under which the states were considered to be the 
sole locus of sovereignty to the exclusion of the federal govern-
ment.59 The range of respectable views was truncated at one 
end, shifting the balance toward more nationalist conceptions of 
the Constitution. What had previously been a somewhat moder-
ate states' rights position now became the extreme end of the 
spectrum. The result was to transform the nature of constitu-
tional debate. Rather than being forced to focus on the highly 
contested supremacy of national law, the task was merely to 
mark out the outer boundries of national sovereignty. While 
disputes would rage for another seventy years about the range of 
federal power,60 many previously contested powers such as the 
protective tariff and internal improvements were settled. After 
many years in the wilderness, the Supremacy Clause had finally 
come into its own. 
Thus, Fletcher is right to see the Civil War as a critical turn-
ing point in constitutional history. But he overestimates the 
breadth of the transformation, which was actually more pro-
found regarding federalism than racial equality. The Civil War 
only imperfectly accomplished the vision that Lincoln expressed 
at Gettysburg. The "cash value" of the Gettysburg address was 
the end of slavery and the creation of the modern American na-
59. See Forrest McDonald, States' Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 
1776-I876 at 194 (U. Press of Kansas, 2000) 
60. As Lincoln put it: 
This relative matter of National power, and State rights, as a principle, is no 
other than the principle of generality, and locality. Whatever concerns the 
whole, should be confided to the whole-to the general government; while, 
whatever concerns only the State, should be left exclusively, to the State. This 
is all there is of original principle about it. Whether the National Constitution, 
in defining boundaries between the two, has applied the principle with exact ac-
curacy, is not to be questioned. We are all bound by that defining, without 
questiOn. 
Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in Selected Writings at 311 (cited in 
note 15). 
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tion. The other part of Lincoln's message-a "new birth of free-
dom" -was only a promissory note, one that was dishonored 
with the end of Reconstruction and then lay forgotten for nearly 
a century. 
